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1 Introduction 
The term the Internet of Things (IoT)is somewhat ambiguous 
in that its definition varies dependant on who is using it and in 
what context. Arguably it has gained traction with a wider 
audience, over other terms such as ubiquitous computing or 
pervasive computing, in that it is made up of the words 
‘internet’ and ‘things’ which are more generally accessible 
terms. However, this also means that it is open interpretation 
depending upon the meaning an individual associates to these 
terms resulting in the variety of discourses which invariably 
help shape how it is perceived, developed and adopted. While 
this paper is couched in IoT discussions, it is arguably 
applicable to discourses about technology more generally.  
 
The current (and future) adoption of the IoT has, for some 
time, stimulated debate about the broader implications for 
privacy [24], ethics, trust and security that the IoT. Given the 
IoT’s penchant for generating and utilising various 
(oftentimes somewhat personal) data, the European Union’s 
(EU) forthcoming General Data Protection Regulations 
(GDPR) will have a significant impact on how the IoT is 
regulated. As with the term IoT the interpretation of GDPR is 
generating its own discourses particularly around how 
wording within the regulation is turned into implementation 
  
The paper begins by critiquing the term Privacy by Design 
(PbD), and an alternate form which appears in article 25 of 
the GDPR Data protection by design and default. We note 
that these two phrases are in fact part of a broader group 
which inexhaustively includes: Security by Design, Privacy 
by Default, Security by Default, Data Protection by Design, 
Data Protection by Default. Our critique does not concern the 
sentiments or intentions represented by these phrases, or PbD 
per se, but highlights ambiguities and potentially misleading 
interpretations that their invocation promotes. After exploring 
these potential pitfalls, we go on to discuss design-led 
research that positions Informed by Design as a more fruitful 
approach to creating IoT devices and services which can more 
meaningfully respond to concerns about privacy, ethics, trust 
and security. 
 
Informed by Design draws upon design-led futures research 
into the adoption and acceptability of the IoT in domestic 
settings (although the ideas may well be applicable to other 
contexts too). Using Design Fiction [3,10,20] to explore 
contemporary philosophies that explore New Materiality 
[9,36] and Object Oriented Ontology [5,17,19,22], our 
proposal for an Informed by Design approach intends to 
deliver actionable implementation strategies. In doing so we 
aim to provide a framework to help designers produce IoT 
services and devices that meaningfully comply with GDPR, 
not only to the letter, but with its spirit too.  
2 […] by […] 
Our initial discussion is relatively broadly scoped, and 
explores issues across a gamut of related terminology. For 
example, configuring something by default is not the same as 
creating something in a particular form, by design. However, 
arguably to have something configured a particular way by 
default means that it must have been designed that way, and if 
something is set up to, by default, in a particular way then it 
must have been designed. This issue is exacerbated because 
‘design’ can be used in so many different ways in the English 
language, e.g. the designer used her knowledge of design to 
design the widget, which was then the design. The original 
source of this conflation between ‘by design’ and ‘by default’ 
appears to be an influential report which, on several 
occasions, employs forms of words such as “incorporates 
Privacy by Design principles by default” [8]. 
 
These already murky waters may appear completely opaque 
even before we introduce the further depths of difficult 
abstractions like privacy and security. To unpack these very 
quickly: privacy is not the same as security, but in some 
circumstances privacy may be delivered by security and 
security may be delivered by privacy. When attempting to 
make sense of this disciplinary idiosyncrasies may well come 
into play too. For example, it’s plausible that an engineer may 
interpret security in terms of a particular implementation, like 
access control lists, whereas a psychologist may think of it in 
terms of a psychological theory, such as Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs. Both are valid routes forward, however when their 
epistemological roads intersect, common understanding will 
not necessary be the immediate destination. Whilst these 
definitional anxieties are not unique to IoT and PbD, they 
must be acknowledged for the sake of intentional specificity. 
Although the argument in this paper intersects with much 
wider debates, for the most part the specific issues we are 
interested in are (1) Privacy by Design as it was described by 
by the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner [8] 
and (2) Data protection by design and by default as it appears 
in article 25 of the GDPR [39]. In the following we unpack 
aspects of both of these areas in more detail. 
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2.1 Privacy by Design 
The term can be traced back to a 1995 report1 on Privacy-
enhancing technologies which was bootstrapped for the 
modern era in a 2012 report Privacy by Design in the Age of 
Big Data [8]. In the foreword to the report Ann Cavoukian 
quotes a 13th century Persia poet’s words to articulate that to 
reinvent the world, one must speak a new language. The 
subtext is that technological progress is itself a new language, 
but one that brings with it new challenges with respect to 
privacy. Within the foreword Cavoukian then gives an 
example of what PbD is: a way of processing data that has 
been cryptographically hashed. This means that although 
patterns can be found in the data, apparently there is no way 
to reverse engineer it and find out what the original data was. 
While the example seems compelling, it is arguably also a 
little naïve. Although such technical approaches can, in 
particular circumstances, protect the privacy of individuals 
who are represented in the data, to make the assumption that a 
system built with this technique can be operated free from 
privacy concerns would be remiss. In this particular example, 
assuming an actor had access to the source data, and also 
knew the details of the hash algorithm, then the privacy 
protection would be circumvented with ease.  
 
The 2012 report is largely based on technical work done by 
Jeff Jonas and focuses on seven principles that for creating 
systems that are private by design. The principles include: 
 
• Full attribution for each data record; 
• Data tethering (that any changes to data are recorded 
immediately); 
• Analytics on anonymised data; 
• Tamper-resistant audit logs; 
• Engineer systems to tend toward false negative 
rather than false positive in borderline cases; 
• Self-correcting conclusions (check prior conclusions 
based on new data); 
• Information transfer accounting (wherever the data 
goes, it should be trackable and traceable—whether 
that is to a hard copy, monitor, or another system) 
 
These principles are specifically concerned with 
‘sensemaking systems’ (i.e systems that synthesise data from 
multiple systems such as payroll, customer relationship 
management, financial accounting) and make sense out of it. 
While the principles do make some sense within that specific 
context, they are regrettably too specific to make much sense 
in the heterogeneous user groups and devices of the IoT (even 
within domestic IoT there is a huge variety) and hence these 
guidelines aren’t a particularly useful start point if one wishes 
to understand the acceptability (and associated adoptability) 
of domestic IoT devices. 
 
When exploring the challenges of PbD, Sarah Spiekermann 
notes “Data is like water: it flows and ripples in ways that are 
difficult to predict” [29]. Her notes going forward suggest 
                                                        
1 http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/10000/184530.pdf 
PbD is rather idealistic and, in practice, can be resolved to a 
utilisation of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies combined with 
additional security, aiming to create a “fault-proof” 
landscape. As she puts it, “the reality is much more 
challenging”. Spiekermann highlights the idealism by 
referring to the advertising revenues garnered by, for 
example, Google and Facebook, pointing out that “without 
personal data, such services are unthinkable” and that 
proponents of PbD “hardly embrace these economic facts in 
their reasoning”. Put differently, it may not be possible to 
create systems which are profitable and feature-rich without 
contravening some of the current ideals of PbD.  
 
That is not to say that PbD isn’t successful, and indeed a 
powerful way to approach system design. Responding to 
Spiekermann, Cavoukian notes her broad agreement with the 
analysis, but also insists “the challenges of PbD are not as 
great as Spiekermann suggested; the engineers I have met 
have embraced the PbD principles, finding implementation 
not difficult” [7], citing experience of discussions with large 
tech companies and project experience on the Ontario Smart 
Grid. It seems to be the case that part of Spiekermann’s 
critique is to point out that to do PbD effectively, it must 
become part of organisational culture, cutting through 
management, marketing, design and engineering. Cavoukian 
agrees saying this is possible. That specific projects can be 
carried out with some semblance of PbD spanning from the 
top down, and the bottom up, is true. However, the more 
interesting part of Spiekermann’s commentary touches on 
potentially systemic shortcomings are the core of PbD’s 
rhetoric: a ‘fault-proof’ landscape is unrealistic and the 
‘economic facts’ of many business models seem to be 
conveniently ignored. 
 
These two factors, are perhaps what causes PbD to stagnate, 
and to struggle to move from principles to practicalities. 
Another way to look at it echoes Shapiro’s suggestion that 
neither engineers nor customers are able to properly 
articulate, understand or analyse the impact of ‘non-
functional’ requirements (those which do not impact on a 
system’s behaviour, but do effect its acceptability) like 
privacy [28]. These hard-to-grasp requirements operate at a 
completely different level of abstraction to what engineers 
and customers are comfortable dealing with. 
 
So, to recap. The new language of technology is making a 
new world, but, we’re quite fluent in the language or 
comfortable in the world yet. While purely technical 
responses to privacy sometimes appear to have faultless 
solutions (e.g. processing irreversibly hashed data), however, 
rarely will that solution be generally applicable, and often it 
may be defeated by similar means to which it was 
implemented. Fundamental principles appear to be useful 
mechanisms; however, their fundamentality often seems 
compromised when seen through the lenses of specific 
contexts, or types of context. Although PbD has demonstrably 
helped to inform the delivery of privacy-aware projects with 
buy-in from developers, customers, and management alike, 
examples of this appear to be isolated and do not necessarily 
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cut through the aforementioned difficulties. Rhetoric around 
PbD hints at the feasibility of creating a ‘fault-proof’ 
approach to privacy and often fails to appreciate the economic 
realities of what makes data-centric businesses viable.  
2.2 GDPR Art. 25: Data protection by design and default 
When the GDPR becomes active across the European Union 
on 25th May 2018 the data protection legislation across a 
swathe of Europe will immediately change. Given that the 
regulations protect citizens regardless of where data 
pertaining to them is held, it will also impact upon a huge 
number of organisations who hold data about European 
citizens, who will have to comply or risk sanctions. There is 
little certainty about how GDPR will play out in practice 
though, as it is a complex legal assemblage, and in parts has 
scope for sovereign nations to interpret it as they see fit while 
other aspects will be enforced by EU bodies. Notwithstanding 
differences in local interpretation, guidelines about how to 
interpret the regulations will take time to emerge. Among the 
gamut of these challenges, various facets of minutiae may 
cause further complications; for example, particular phrases 
may have quite contrasting meanings in the different 
languages that GDPR is written in [15]. 
 
Within the GDPR, article 25 deals specifically with Data 
protection by default and design, and hence whenever those 
concepts are drawn upon by other articles or recitals, they, in 
turn, cite article 25 [37]. The opening words of the article say 
that data controllers must take “the state of the art” into 
account however no scrutiny is given to what state of the art 
might really mean. Given that this assertion is made in under 
the heading ‘data protection by design and default’ we might 
infer that there’s a relationship between the two, but the terms 
of that relationship are left unwritten. Article 25 also makes 
reference to the ‘by default’ trope, saying that appropriate 
measures be taken to ensure that, by default, “only personal 
data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the 
processing are processed”.  So, on face value it seems that 
GDPR’s interpretation of data-protection by design, and 
relatedly default, is at best ambiguous. It certainly doesn’t 
progress the PbD debate about how to move beyond 
principles and towards specific guidelines. This lack of 
specificity that regulators have with respect to PbD (and its 
relatives) is not confined to the text of the GDPR. The UK 
Information Commissioners Office (ICO) the body in the UK 
responsible for interpreting and enforcing GDPR provides 
guidance on PbD, however within their guidance they do not 
proffer any clear definition of what it is or how to implement 
it2, only referring to projects run by Cavoukian’s department 
in Ontario. While it may seem unreasonable to expect 
European regulators define a working model and clear 
definition of PbD, given that scholars across various 
disciplines have struggled to do so, including the terminology 
in the GDPR without attending to PbD’s lack of clear 
definition, could become problematic. 
                                                        
2 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/privacy-by-
design/ 
2.3 Unsinkable by Design 
Hubris can be dangerous. The infamous ocean liner Titanic 
developed reputation for being unsinkable prior to its maiden 
voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. While the ship was 
technologically advanced and had state of the art safety 
measures at the core of its design, given its untimely demise, 
it seems laughable to suggest that it could have been 
unsinkable. Reportedly, the ship received ample warning to 
avoid the ice berg that eventually tore open one side of her 
hull, however given the level of confidence about her 
unsinkability, the message was never delivered to the Captain. 
Furthermore, there were not enough lifeboats for those aboard 
and because of lack of preparation for such an emergency 
panic and disorganisation took hold as the ship went down. 
The tale of the titanic shows us that simply embracing the 
‘state of the art’ can actually be counter-productive, and, 
under some circumstances can encourage systematically 
unhelpful behaviour (not having enough lifeboats, or telling 
the captain about an iceberg on collision course, for example). 
 
Allegorically similar, bicycle locks come in a myriad of 
shapes, sizes and at various price points; chain-locks, D-
locks, combination locks, cable locks, smart locks and so on. 
Some locks are more secure than others, however, given the 
right tools, expertise, and amount of time a thief can break 
any lock. Hence, considering the most prestigious lock totally 
‘safe’ or the tackiest cheap lock ‘not safe’ represent a not-
particularly-helpful hubristic position. One alternative is to 
look at locks in terms of an average or estimated protection 
time (i.e. to give you an idea of how long it might take a 
dedicated thief to break it). Arguably we need similarly 
interpretive schemes to understand where a given system 
intersects with its privacy requirements. 
 
To consider the traps such perceptions represent more 
generally we utilise Heffalumps which are type of fictional 
elephant, which appear in A.A. Milne’s Whinnie the Pooh 
stories. Even within the realms of the stories Heffalumps are 
imaginary, only ever appearing in Pooh’s mind. Nonetheless, 
one day Pooh and his sidekick Piglet attempt to catch one by 
building a trap. Unfortunately, after setting the trap, they get 
lost and—somehow—stumble into a trap themselves (it is 
inferred it is the same trap they laid). The term Heffalump 
Trap3 has become a term in political journalism used to 
describe occasions when a trap is set up to catch an opponent, 
but ends up catching the person set the trap (see figure 1). 
 
Each of these tales can be considered an allegory for PbD. 
Even though it was not the designers or engineers of Titanic 
which began and proliferated stories about her unsinkability, 
the myth took hold and even the crew believed it. Similarly, 
to believe that one’s top of the range whizz-bang bicycle lock 
sold by a prestigious brand, is completely unbreakable would 
be remiss, and could easily lead to an unanticipated theft. 
Promoting binary positions—whether they regard sinking 
ships, bicycles, or privacy—promotes irrational beliefs. From 
                                                        
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heffalump#Cultural_impact 
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these irrational beliefs a toxicity grows, and while the thin 
end of the wedge may result in inconvenient bicycle thefts, at 
the other end of the spectrum it can result in a systemic 
miscalculation of risk, which in the case of Titanic meant a 
needless loss of life. An obvious mitigation strategy is to 
provide interpretable information about relative merits of a 
particular solution, whatever the domain is.  
 
Relating this back to our core discussion, we suggest that if 
not handled carefully, PbD, could act as a Heffalump trap. If 
the level to which a system protects privacy is assumed to be 
high (or ‘high enough’) simply because it followed PbD 
principles, then the person holding this belief—regardless of 
whether they are user, consumer, or designer—puts 
themselves at risk of being caught out on the occasion that the 
system isn’t as private as they thought. This can have an 




Figure 1. Depiction of a Heffalump Trap. 
 
In terms of the how GDPR, there seems to be a danger that, 
given ‘data protection by design and default’ is barely 
specified, that data controllers will interpret the approaches 
mentioned in article 25 (e.g. data minimisation, 
pseudonymisation, et cetera) and treat systems which utilise 
those as compliant without critically examining tangible 
impacts and risks associated with a system’s data usage. By 
extension the other articles and recitals which depend upon 
data protection being delivered by design and default will 
inherit the same shortcomings. Plausibly the engineers, 
lawyers, a customers of particular data controllers may, given 
that their products ‘do data protection by design and default’ 
assume that doing this means that their systems operate in 
accordance with GDPR’s aims. In reality, they would simply 
be adhering to the minimum legal suggestion of what GDPR 
lists under the header ‘data protection by design and default’, 
and which doesn’t bear much resemblance to more involved 
attempts to understand how to actually enact PbD.  
 
Practitioners using PbD are at risk in a similar way, whether 
or not they are governed by the GDPR. Despite the 
temptation to believe that following privacy can be ‘achieved’ 
by following the various principles of PbD, it simply is not 
the case. Notions of such ‘fault-proof’ systems are akin to 
unsinkable ships or impenetrable locks; they are illusions and 
do not exist. Even accepting that such systems don’t exist, we 
must also contend with the fact that to move to a digital 
economy that can function without the gathering and 
collecting of personal data is akin to a physical economy that 
can work without oil; some major disruption needs to take 
place before this can be a reality. The lack of coherence in 
PbD methods, relatively immature models and frames for 
understanding what privacy is, and hence difficulty in 
actually implementing PbD confound all these issues too. 
 
Ship captains, bicycle owners, and Heffalump trappers, and 
system developers; beware. Don’t claim the ship is 
unsinkable, don’t claim lock is unbreakable, don’t try to catch 
the imaginary animal—most importantly, don’t assume it’s 
possible to build a system that’s flawlessly ‘private by 
design’. Instead, strive for a system which is transparent and 
informative, as well as embracing concepts like data 
minimisation and pseudonymisation. 
3 Informed by Design 
Although we wish to highlight the danger of attempting to 
catch Heffalumps and build unsinkable ships—i.e. misplaced 
beliefs that PbD can, with some assurance, deliver privacy-
compliant systems—we also wish to commend the endeavour. 
In the the following we introduce a subtly different framing of 
privacy as Informed by Design (IbD). By describing a notion 
at a higher level of abstraction this form of words is 
immediately advantageous and avoids the somewhat messy 
and easily conflated privacy by design, security by design 
and/or data protection by design (and/or default). Relatedly, 
by suggesting that the thing being enabled or delivered by 
design is information, as opposed to fiendishly-hard-to-define 
concepts like privacy or security, the scope of expectations 
with IbD is arguably easier to comprehend and deliver than it 
is with PbD. 
 
Our approach to IbD has developed as a Research through 
Design [13,14,21] derived outcome, of a series of Design 
Fiction projects [3,10,20]. Widely attributed to the writer 
Bruce Sterling [31,32], but significantly further developed by 
designer and researcher Julian Bleecker and his collaborators 
at the Near Future Laboratory [3,4], Design Fiction is a 
method of speculative design which focuses on building 
fictional worlds. Design fictions contain users, environments, 
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and technologies. The technologies they contain may often be 
‘real’ insofar as they exist in some early or prototypical form 
in the present, however they are ‘fictional’ in the way they 
only exist diegetically in an artificially fabricated future world 
[10]. As well as using Design Fiction as a methodology, as-is, 
we specifically used it to experiment with Object Oriented 
Ontology (OOO) as a theoretical means to respond to the new 
types of network agency that the IoT has enabled. In the 
following we discuss OOO and Design Fiction in a little more 
detail, before describing the projects from which we derived 
these insights. 
3.1 Object Oriented Ontology 
As we are not philosophers we willingly defer the task of 
arguing OOO’s validity and/or critiquing its merits to those 
more qualified than ourselves. However, what follows aims to 
articulate an accessible summary of our interpretation of 
OOO and to contextualise the subsequent account of the 
interplay between our design practice and engagement with 
theory.  
 
In his seminal work Being and Time, Heidegger presents his 
view of ontology. By laying the foundations for OOO this 
highly influential 20th century philosophical text has taken on 
a new life in the 21st century [18]. The traditional 
Heideggerian view argues that things—objects—are all but 
impossible to understand in their own phenomenological 
terms, and therefore, we should make sense of them in 
relation to human use. Heidegger coined neologisms to 
communicate his argument, and famously uses a hammer as 
an example. When a hammer (or other object) is in its normal 
context of use it is ‘ready-to-hand’ and if that context is 
disturbed (for example if the head of the hammer fell off) 
then it is described as ‘present-at-hand’. The metaphysics of 
this distinction are complex and must be negotiated outside of 
this paper, but the important point to note is that the hammer 
only comes into being via a human use (or perhaps non-use, 
in the case of the broken hammer). Central to the 
Heideggerian position is the notion that existence is a 
“correlate between [the human] mind and world” [5]. That 
these two constructs are inseparably linked is what 
Meillassoux refers to as ‘correlationism’ [16]. OOO rejects 
this correlationism and instead entertains the idea that objects 
have their own realities which are distinct from human use 
and from the mind/world correlate. From this post-
correlationist position, anything—literally any thing, from a 
fibre optic cable, to a blade of grass, to a quantum computer, 
to a gooseberry fool—may be cast in the limelight of its own 
ontological resolve. If we consider the amalgamated glow 
emanating from the bazillions of tiny lights-of-non-
correlationism then the resulting plane of luminescence is 
what illuminates OOO’s “flat ontology” [6]. Having departed 
from familiar and intuitive human-centric ontologies, the 
vantage point one assumes when considering the nature of 
OOO’s flat ontology is a strange and conflicted place: 
 
“In short, all things equally exist, yet they do not exist equally 
[…] This maxim may seem like a tautology—or just a gag. 
It’s certainly not the sort of qualified, reasoned, hand-wrung 
ontological position that’s customary in philosophy. But such 
an extreme take is required for the curious garden of things to 
flow. Consider it a thought experiment, as all speculation 
must be: what if we shed all criteria whatsoever and simply 
hold that everything exits, even things that don’t? […] none’s 
existence fundamentally different from another, none more 
primary nor more original.” [5:11] 
 
This open-endedness is necessary because in OOO ‘objects’ 
are not just material objects, but extend to anything. Such a 
categorisation requires special appreciation and a theory 
which allows for multiple types of ‘Being’ to meaningfully 
coexist. Exemplifying this Bogost uses the famously ill-fated 
video game E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial as an example. He 
muses that the game is simultaneously many different things: 
 
• 8 kilobytes of opcodes; 
• a compilation of source into assembly code; 
• a flow of radio frequency into a television; 
• a plastic cartridge; 
• memory etched on wafer; 
• a consumer good; 
• a set of rules and game mechanics; 
• intellectual property; 
• ‘the worst game ever made’; 
• a constituent of 728,000 Atari games buried in New 
Mexico4; 
• all of the above. 
 
There is no elementary thing which comprises the video 
game, it is never a single one of the objects above, nor is it 
their conglomerate. Bogost tells us Latour refers to this as 
‘irreduction’—or the idea that no single thing can be 
truncated to another. Irreduction’s consequence is that in most 
cases inter-object relations are devoid of intimacy or mutual-
knowing, ‘Being’ for different objects is completely distinct 
and thus “objects only unlock each other’s realities to a 
certain extent” [18]. Although incandescently challenging for 
us human objects to comprehend, this view of ontology is 
evocative, powerful, and represents an enticing philosophical 
renaissance “the epistemological tide ebbed, revealing the 
iridescent shells of realism they had so long occluded” [5].  
 
Beyond a shared rejection of correlationism there is much 
disagreement between OOO scholars. Our interpretation 
aligns with that Ian Bogost presents in Alien Phenomenology 
[5]. Of particular influence is the notion of carpentry; the 
practice of creating “machines” that attempt to reveal clues 
about the phenomenology of objects. While it’s accepted that 
objects’ experiences can never be fully understood, the 
machines of carpentry act as proxies for the unknowable. 
They proffer a “rendering satisfactory enough to allow the 
artifact’s operator to gain some insights into an alien thing’s 
perspective” [5:100]. He cites a range of examples some of 
which he created as deliberate acts of carpentry whilst others 
                                                        
4 cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E.T._the_Extra-Terrestrial_(video_game) 
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simply demonstrate his argument serendipitously. One of 
Bogost’s examples is software to visualise how a 90s games 
console stores and constructs sprites and palettes in the 
limited memory available, the result is a unique view on the 
connection between the ‘raw’ image storage, and the game as 
we see it on the screen (ibid). Another example, the Latour 
Litanizer, is a carpentered machine which queries Wikipedia, 
calls upon the random article feature, extracts the article title, 
and presents a list of several random titles. While its 
instrumental purpose is to quickly and easily generate Latour-
like litanies, it also provides a portal of sorts into the interior 
reality of Wikipedia’s content: “Not only does the diversity 
and detachment of being intensify with each fresh litany, but 
those very qualities also invite further discussion of the object 
in question at Wikipedia” [5:96]. 
 
Whether achieved by leveraging computer code or some other 
craft, it is “through the making of things we do philosophy” 
[38]—that is the essence of carpentry. Wakkary et al. do their 
carpentry through material speculations (ibid), and while 
Bogost sees himself as a philosopher-programmer, he notes 
that philosopher-chefs, philosopher-astronomers, and 
philosopher-mechanics are all uniquely equipped as 
carpenters in their own right. In our case, we are exploring the 
possibilities for philosopher-designers. Ensuring that OOO 
finds an outlet in some kind of applied practice is, in fact, 
crucial. It lends OOO a concrete legitimacy that metaphysics 
usually evades:   
 
“If a physician is someone who practices medicine, perhaps a 
metaphysician ought be someone who practices ontology. Just 
as one would likely not trust a doctor who had only read and 
written journal articles about medicine to explain the 
particular curiosities of one’s body, so one ought not trust a 
metaphysician who had only read and written books about the 
nature of the universe.” [5:91] 
 
Hence, material engagements with OOO are what make the 
theory compelling, and carpentry is the process by which that 
engagement happens. Having realised that computers have, 
by virtue of programming languages, relatively accessible 
inner worlds, Bogost realised computers are a particularly 
compelling place to do carpentry. There is some shared 
ground between Bogost’s computer-centric approach to OOO 
and the approach that we adopted with this work. We might 
say that computer programmers, emboldened by the ultimate 
control code has over the computer, allows them to ‘play 
God’ (within the realm of the computer or system they 
happen to be programming). This demiurgic gift affords the 
philosopher-programmer a great deal of freedom to explore 
the objects of the computer realm. As we discuss below, a 
similar quality is afforded when designers unshackle 
themselves from the preconceptions of contemporaneous 
truths, and, with new freedom, make speculative forays into 
the near future. 
3.2 Design Fiction 
Design usually seeks to answer questions, and thus to create 
futures. Speculative design, in contrast, uses design to asks 
questions about possible futures5. Hence the family of 
approaches which we collectively refer to as speculative 
design do not aim to create a products for sale, or that 
necessarily solve a problem, rather they go through the 
motions of design in order to elicit thought and provoke 
deeper understandings [2,11,12]. There are many nuanced 
views on the speculative design landscape which are beyond 
the scope of what we can address in this paper6, however the 
specific method of speculation we are employ is design 
fiction.  
 
There are a number of concurrent yet incongruent 
perspectives on what design fiction is, a disagreement that 
merges with discussions about the most productive ways to 
create and use them. The school of thought referred to as 
‘Design Fiction as World Building’ [10] most exactly 
describes the approach we adopt with this work. The world 
building approach argues that design fiction is the creation of 
multiple artefacts that, when viewed together, describe the 
coordinates of, or ‘entry points’ into, a fictional world (ibid). 
Entry points also tend to depict parts of that world at different 
scales (figure 2). So, a given constituent artefact of a design 
fiction may either represent a large area of the world 
(providing a ‘zoomed out’ summary view), or a smaller area 
(providing a ‘zoomed in’ detail view).  
 
 
Figure 2. Design Fiction as World Building 
 
                                                        
5 Although more couched in the related practice of critical design, this 
asking/answering contrast is summed up nicely in “A/B” [26] 
6 For an overview and disambiguation of critical and speculative design we 
recommend Dunne & Raby [12] and Tonkinwise’s review of the same text 
[35].   
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By creating multi-scaled worlds like this, design fictions 
produce a reciprocal prototyping relationship (figure 3); the 
artefacts define the contours of the fictional world and 
simultaneously prototype the nature of that world. Meanwhile, 
the world that emerges from the artefacts reciprocates and 
prototypes the nature of those artefacts (ibid). As we discuss 
below, we adopted the world building strategy for this 
research. We also suggest that both the individual artefacts, 
and the whole design fiction, may be seen in terms of 
Bogostian carpentry. Returning briefly to the notion of a 
carpenter playing God by manipulating computer code, the 
same logic plays out with design fiction but rather than the 
subroutines, APIs and procedure calls of the computer 
domain, a design fiction-philosopher has the texture and 
contours of the artificial world—and the artefacts that define 
those attributes—at their disposal. 
 
 
Figure 3. Design Fiction as World Building’s reciprocal 
prototyping relationship. 
3.2 Carpentry for the 21st Century; Prototyping Informed 
by Design 
Our discussion and critique of PbD defines the area with 
which our research is concerned. The notes on OOO and 
Design Fiction introduce a theoretical position and method 
which we used to explore that area. Here we recount the 
details of two projects which probed these ideas, and in doing 
so laid the foundations for our IbD proposal.  These Design 
Fictions were built around two fictional technologies. The 
first involved a fictional smart kettle, Polly [22] and the 
second describes a privacy-enhancing technology named 
Orbit [23]. In the following we discuss how both projects led 
us towards the IbD thesis. 
3.3 Polly, The World’s First Truly Smart Kettle 
Our decision to build a Design Fiction world around a kettle 
(as opposed to some other object) was driven by two factors. 
First we were motivated to build upon the trope of mundane 
domestic devices as exemplars of IoT use cases, e.g. the much 
talked about smart refrigerator [1]. Second there are several 
existing smart kettles available in the consumer market which 
exhibit common concerns relating to IoT privacy, security 
and trust.  
 
In the development of this Design Fiction we produced 
several artefacts to help us conceive of the world where Polly 
makes sense. These include a press release describing the 
product and its history, product packaging, and user 
interfaces. Through the creation of these artefacts the texture 
and detail of Polly’s world emerge, in which the kettle 
becomes situated [34]. The press release we created describes 
many of the kettle’s features, these include intelligent 
notifications, synchronization with social media feeds, 
automatic updates, voice activation, usage tracking, location-
based boiling, JustRight smart fill level. Beyond revealing 
features, the press release also tells us more about the world 
that Polly exists within, for example the product was 
originally crowdfunded before subsequently being bought out 
by Amazon’s IoT division. Finally, the press release also 
reveals that Polly is accredited by a government IoT regulator 
named OfIoT and as part of its accreditation utilises an 
alternative to current standards for transferring data over the 
internet named Minimum Necessary Datagram Protocol.  
 
 
Figure 4. Polly’s packaging, featuring logos for OfIoT, 
Amazon IoT, and MNDP. 
 
Our assumption when building Polly’s fictional world was 
that in the future the pervasiveness and ubiquity of data 
collecting devices will grow hand in hand with IoT adoption 
[33]. Presumably IoT kettles will (continue to) collect data 
too. The visibility of the data shared by these devices today is 
at best opaque and at worst absent. In this way shielding the 
user from the underlying data transactions. While PbD 
principles may protect the user from wanted or nefarious 
processing of their personal data, on occasions where that sort 
of processing is necessary to facilitate the device’s 
functionality, on those occasions IbD would suggest making 
the underlying processing visible. We may liken this to an 
autonomous car that would chose an optimized route to its 
destination. Although optimized travel is desirable, if the car 
was unable to reveal precisely what that route was, it would 
not be surprising to feel somewhat mistrustful of it. 
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Responding to this need we constructed two IbD informed 
features. 
 
Figure 5 shows a Polly timeline with several events taking 
place over a period of several hours on 15th April 2017. Each 
event is coded with one or more of 4 icons. A ‘home’ icon is 
used if the data transaction is between the kettle and another 
device on the local network. Two cloud icons, one with an up 
arrow and one with a down arrow, indicate if data is going to 
(up) or coming from (down) the Internet. Finally, a ‘gear’ 
icon is used to denote whether this specific data transaction is 
having a direct effect on the operations or configuration of the 
kettle or other networked devices. From the timeline, we can 
tell that Polly was dormant for over 4 hours since the ‘daily 
cloud pingback’, which uploads usage data to the cloud and 
downloads configuration, security, and update data from the 
cloud. Because this activity involves upload, download and 




Figure 5. Polly’s IbD timeline. 
 
Next we can tell that the kettle is picked up from its base, 
refilled to 58% full, at this point it the software inside Polly 
anticipates (based on being refilled and previous user 
behavior patterns), that it will be boiled soon. We can see that 
removing the kettle from the base and refilling it result in 
immediate sharing of data to the cloud. The anticipation event 
however does not share data to the cloud, but does share data 
with the home’s smart meter and other appliances to inform 
them of an impending power-consumption spike. Next, we 
see an incoming boil request, initiated from within the home, 
hence no upload or download, this is swiftly followed by a 
‘PPTKO’ event (‘Polly Put The Kettle On’), which is logged 
to the cloud. By interacting with the timeline details could be 
revealed showing precisely what data was sent or received, 
where it was sent or received from, and what purpose it plays 
in the constellation.  
 
Figure 6 depicts a volumetric representation of the data 
uploaded from Polly, downloaded to Polly, and moving to or 
from Polly around the local network. This display differs 
from the timeline in that we cannot tell from it why data is 
moving around. However, what we can tell is the relative 
amount of data this smart kettle consumes and gives off, as 
well as the relative volume of those external transactions in 
relation to any ‘chatter’ with other devices on the local 
network. Both displays are intended to be used in conjunction 
with each other such that Polly is quite transparent about to 
what it communicates, for what purpose, and what – in terms 
of volume – the significance of that communication is. We 
might infer from these two displays that Polly ‘gets’ much 
less from the cloud than it ‘gives’. Our Design Fiction does 
not explicitly communicate why this is the case. It could be 
that Polly’s voice recognition software relies on the cloud, 
hence large audio files are uploaded frequently. It could be 
that because Polly appears to log almost every event it detects 
with its cloud provider (figure 6) and thus over time the 
volume of data builds up.  
 
Potentially Polly could have been compromised, and the large 
upload volume is because Polly is part of a botnet. The ‘truth’ 
of why Polly uploads so much data is not, in fact, important to 
the paper and is a piece of information that will remain in the 
interior of the Design Fiction world. The world we have built 
for Polly to exist in, within which we have prototyped two 
features inspired by concerns to do with privacy and 
opportunities presented by OOO, serves as a first step to 
explore how thinking in terms of a flat ontology can be 




Figure 6. Polly’s data usage graph. 
3.3 Orbit Privacy 
This project specifically focused on the interaction between a 
user and a technology whereby the user consents for their data 
to be collected, profiled, or otherwise used. We did this with 
the GDPR’s specific protections in mind. Although legal 
interpretations are so far untested in courts the articles of the 
GDPR theoretically protect the right: 
 
• To be aware what personal data is held about an 
individual; 
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• To access any personal data that is held; 
• To rectify inaccurate personal data that is held;  
• Of data portability (i.e. to extract data in a readable 
form to be taken elsewhere); 
• To refuse permission for processing or profiling of 
personal data; 
• That any consent obtained relating to personal data 
must be verifiable, specific, unambiguous and freely 
given. 
 
The apparatus of consent (i.e. how information is presented to 
users, and how that consent is recorded) is the problem area 
that became of particular interest to us. Although some 
progress has been made recently, for example pre-ticked 
checkboxes non-consensual cookie usage were both outlawed 
in Europe in 20117, tick boxes for users to indicate they have, 
understood, and agree to conditions of use is still the norm. 
There are fundamental problems with this approach, the most 
obvious being that while pre-GDPR laws assume a tick in a 
box as legal consent, in practice it is very rare that users 
actually have read the terms, and even less so that they have 
understood them. Crudely but vividly demonstrating how 
such agreements are not an effective way to gain meaningful 
consent, a 2016 study found that only 25% of participants 
looked at the agreement at all, and only 2% could 
demonstrate reasonable comprehension [25]. One-size-fits-all 
approaches, whereby user agreements are written in such a 
way as to obtain all the permission the device could ever 
need, structurally remove the ability for users to be selective 
about which features of a system they actually want to use, 
and thus denies them the GDPR protection for ‘specific 
unambiguous’ consent. These systems also fail to account for 
temporality meaningfully; once consent has been given it is 
often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to revoke all or 
part of it at a later date.  
 
We elected to use an IoT lock as the fulcrum, around which 
other aspects of the Design Fiction world would coalesce. 
Inspired by IoT locks that already exist on the market8 the 
fictional lock has the following features: 
 
• Keyless opening using NFC; 
• Geofencing (automatically lock/unlock depending on 
user’s location); 
• Providing guests temporary access via smartphone; 
• Voice activation (via a voice agent such as Amazon 
Echo); 
• Interfacing with other services (via integrative 
platforms such as IFTTT). 
 
In terms of the design problem, each feature requires a subtly 
different relationship with collected data, where data is stored, 
and how it is processed. Keyless opening using NFC 
operation only requires that data be stored within the user’s 
own network; geofencing requires that data be processed by 




the lock company; and services such as IFTTT could lead to 
data being shared with any number of 3rd parties. Given that 
the design fiction’s primary concern was GDPR, we opted to 
give technical implementation only cursory consideration and 
working around the assumption the lock is activated, via a 
hub, by an IoT radio standard such as ZigBee and that 
suitable APIs facilitate integration with external services such 




Figure 7. Still from supporting video showing the simple lock 
design. The electronics are housed in this plate which 
would replace one side of the standard lock plate with the 
remainder of the lock mechanism remaining the same. 
 
Initially we wished to design a kind of map that could be used 
during the consent process to illustrate to a user what data 
would go where, so that they would be, insofar as the consent 
process, be informed by design. This task, however, was 
fraught with difficulties arising from how complex potential 
data-relationships are, even in relatively straightforward IoT 
systems such as a smart lock. Figure 8 illustrates a data 
scenario around an IoT lock which has been configured to 
trigger smart lighting to turn on when the user unlocks the 
door. While the cause and effect are straightforward and 
visible to the user (opening the door results in the lights 
coming on), there are in fact at least three cloud services 
behind the scenes making the hardware work, and as shown 
in this example there may be unknown 3rd parties using the 
data too. To translate this into a static map that details 
absolutely and concretely where data goes and when, is not 
viable. Confounding the already difficult task, our human 
appreciation of context makes the challenge even harder. To 
cartographically represent or respond to each human object’s 
understanding of context-specific ‘acceptability’ (i.e. when it 
is okay to share data and when it is not okay) is something 
that needs to be done on a case-by-case basis [27].  
 
To resolve our mapping-misgivings we needed to make two 
compromises, although this changes the nature of the design 
space it does not hamper our enquiry’s overall aim to explore 
practice and philosophy. First, we reduced the scope of our 
interest from ‘GDPR compliance’ to ‘personal identifiability’. 
Second, we had to reject the wholly deterministic view that 
our exploration of data packets brought, and instead build a 
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map with the ability to communicate aspects of context, risk, 
and probability. Hence, it turned out that our dalliance with 
OOO took a route that we had not initially expected. We 
anticipated that exploring the tiny ontologies of the IoT lock 
itself, the data it produces, and its users, would lead us toward 
carpentry applicable to one of those objects, what actually 
happened is that we arrived at an artefact of carpentry around 
an entirely new object—one that communicates the likelihood 
of identifiability—and whose own tiny ontology, offers a new 
way to view any specific assemblage of devices, services, 
data, and people. By communicating the chance that a person 
could be identifiable based on the data associated with device 
use, and presenting that in terms of whether the data is held 
on devices owned by a user, servers owned by companies the 
user knows, or servers owned by ‘anyone else’, we aimed to 
have defined a construct that could represent both sides of the 





Figure 8. Triggered by the user unlocking a door data flows 
across and is processed on different networks and does not 
necessarily have a specific end point. 
 
The most basic forms of our aware identifiability maps that 
appreciate notions of risk and probability, are shown in figure 
8. Due to some metaphorical and visual similarity to the Bohr 
model of the hydrogen atom9 we have referred to these as 
‘Orbits’, or Identifiability Orbits. These maps represent data 
that is generated, stored and processed as part of an IoT 
system, and specifically where that data is held. A circular 
band represents each ‘level’ of data and our key privacy 
construct of identifiability is communicated by how sharp or 
blurry the edge of that level is. Hence, if the circle is the 
middle is razor-sharp, it is almost definite that the user could 
be identified by the data at that level. The blurrier the edge of 
any level is, the less likely it is that a user could be identified. 
 




Figure 9. Early prototype design for the identifiability Orbits. 
 
Exploring how the design might be implanted, and how a user 
might interact with it, we implanted the Identifiability Orbits 
into our design fiction world by creating a film that depicts a 
user adding a lock to their smart home. The interaction in our 
film is triggered by instructing a voice agent to detect new 
devices; once the lock is detected the home’s, the voice agent 
instructs the user to use the supporting ‘Orbit Privacy App’ on 
the user’s phone so they can configure their privacy settings. 
By using a slider, the various functions of the lock can be 
enabled/disabled and the data implications of those choices 




Figure 10.  Stills from the design fiction film. A user uses the 
Orbit-based privacy app to configure which functions their 
IoT lock will have permission to use. On the left they have 
enabled maximum functionality, Orbit updates to show 
that the user will most likely be identifiable at all levels, 
although that is not certain with third parties. The inverse 
is shown on the right.  
 
With the basic interaction demonstrated the film proceeds to 
demonstrate how a user may use such an app to dynamically 
modify their choices (figure 10). In our scenario, the user 
originally configured their lock for maximum privacy. The 
scenario extends to show that, if notified by a delivery 
company who require access to the house, the Orbit app 
communicates to the user identifiability implications of the 
data flow associated with provisioning temporary access to 
the delivery company, before revoking it again once delivery 
is completed. Although this work was completed before it 
was announced, this is a data flow very reminiscent of that 
supporting Amazon Key10.  
4 Discussion 
Our OOO-informed Design Fictions work within this 
sentiment: “Security by design and privacy by design can be 




achieved only by design. We need a firmer grasp of the 
obvious” [28]. While privacy is an extremely challenging 
notion to meaningfully grasp, and involves a huge amount of 
ultimately particularity, our argument suggests that concepts 
like PbD, or the GDPR’s article 25, are misleadingly 
reassuring. By referring to technologies both specifically 
(pseudonymisation, for example) and ambiguously (‘state of 
the art’, for example) PbD masquerades as a ‘solution’ to 
privacy, yet in practice it arguably represents a Heffalump 
trap. Informed by Design approaches may offer a 
counterpoint. Where PbD tries to be methodical, IbD is 
intentionally contingent; where PbD strives for answers, IbD 
intentionally highlights questions; PbD may be criticised for 
its ambiguity, IbD is intended to be interpreted. A simple way 
to measure something that is implemented with IbD at its core 
is to ask, “are the users informed about any privacy 
implications of this system?” Although summarising the 
proposal to such a simple question makes it seem 
straightforward, and perhaps simple, alas it is not.  
 
First, as demonstrated particularly in the Orbit example, 
refining the ideals of OOO into an actionable process is not 
always straightforward—translating philosophy into design 
practice, although fruitful, is challenging [23,30]. Second, to 
translate context-rich and human abstractions such as 
‘privacy’ into specific design constraints falls under the 
complications of any given design’s ultimate particularity. 
However, the argument presented here aims to articulate that 
the barebones of PbD are not, alone, enough to meaningfully 
develop interactive systems that go beyond the letter of 
regulations such as GDPR to also respect their ideals. IbD, 
however, goes some way to resolve this issue. 
 
Above all else this paper advocates for a more considered 
engagement with the complexities of designing for the IoT 
such that the non-functional requirements engineers have 
traditionally struggled to deal with, may be approached 
heuristically. In order to drive the adoption of acceptable IoT 
devices designers, engineers and policy-makers need to set 
aside beliefs that a system can, by design, circumvent any 
concerns about a system’s privacy. Instead, the IoT needs to 
be designed with a considered approach to privacy that 
accepts IoT devices do pose problems for individuals’ 
privacy, but that those problems can be tempered by 
transparently informing users about how the system works, 
and consciously not attempting to trap Heffalumps. 
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